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Impacts and Incidence of Agricultural 
Commodity Programs 
E. Kwan Choi and Stanley R. Johnson* 
Iowa State University 
The only farm resource whose price or annual use value is 
significantly affected by government programs, either 
through higher output prices or deficiency payments, is 
land. [D. GALE JOHNSON]1 
I. Introduction 
Since the passage of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, com- 
modity programs have had a major impact on resource use and returns 
to factors in U.S. agriculture. While the need to insulate domestic 
agricultural markets from the vagaries of international price move- 
ments has been emphasized in developing countries,2 farm price sup- 
ports are often justified as a means of redistributing income from 
consumers to commodity producers.3 An important issue is whether 
producers are the ultimate beneficiaries of commodity programs. 
John E. Floyd, Paul R. Johnson, T. D. Wallace, and Gordon C. 
Rausser and J. W. Freebairn investigated social costs of commodity 
programs.4 These studies are based on estimates of producer and con- 
sumer surpluses that depend on price elasticities of demand and short- 
run supply curves. For example, Floyd employed linearly homoge- 
neous production functions and demonstrated that in the short run 
farm-price supports benefit landowners more than producers.5 
Recently, D. Gale Johnson focused on long-run distributional con- 
sequences of commodity programs and argued that in the long run 
landowners are the recipients of all commodity program benefits. If 
they do not benefit in the long run, why do producers advocate price 
support programs for agricultural commodities? The puzzle is resolved 
(1) if rent adjustment is slow and producers gain in the short run or 
(2) if producers are also landowners. Although the short-run incidence 
of the benefits of commodity programs is influenced by the speed of 
? 1993 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 
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606 Economic Development and Cultural Change 
rent adjustment, the long-run incidence is determined by the propor- 
tion of farmland owned by producers. 
In this article we investigate the short-run and long-run incidences 
of commodity program benefits. We assume that nonland inputs are 
supplied by competitive firms and that the long-run supplies of the 
nonland inputs are perfectly elastic. Free entry insures that in long-run 
equilibrium all benefits accrue to landowners. This increase in the 
rental price of land permits landowners to extract the entire producer 
surplus.6 Moreover, long-run equilibrium land rent rises more than 
proportionately with increases in the target price. 
II. Price Supports and Land Demand 
Our analysis is based on a stylized scenario of agricultural production 
with the following assumptions. 
a) Timing of input decisions. The target prices are announced 
at the beginning of the annual production period. Producers then make 
land-use decisions that depend on the target price and observed input 
prices. Once allocated, land becomes indivisible and fixed ex post. 
Other nonland input decisions, however, are made after the land is 
allocated. 
b) Modified competition. Product and factor markets are as- 
sumed to be competitive. At the beginning of the period, producers 
have free entry and exit.7 However, perfect competition is modified 
by government intervention through target prices and land control. 
c) Price subsidy. To study the long-run impacts of commodity 
programs, target prices are assumed to be maintained by a price sub- 
sidy rather than by a buffer stock. 
d) Identical producers. Producers are assumed to use identical 
production technology. 
e) Two primary inputs. Producers obtain output q by using two 
primary inputs, land L and the nonland input X. The nonland input X 
is a composite input including labor, chemicals, and capital equipment 
used in agriculture but excluding land. 
If there are no fixed inputs, free entry implies that a price subsidy 
program is not sustainable because the government cost can increase 
without limit. However, as Gary S. Becker asserts, the government is 
compelled to control its cost because rising dead weight costs and 
increasing government cost curtail the political power of subsidy recip- 
ients.8 Assumption b acknowledges that to contain the program cost 
the government limits eligible producers by controlling the supply of 
eligible land in U.S. commodity programs. 
Assumption c eliminates the complications arising from buffer 
stocks and attendant storage cost problems.9 In practice, the govern- 
ment may hold some inventories in long-run equilibrium. For example, 
an equilibrium buffer stock may be established such that its size does 
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not change from period to period. However, the government will not 
alter the size of buffer stock when the market is in stationary long- 
run equilibrium. For this reason buffer stocks are not included in the 
analysis. 
Producers may differ in farm size and production cost. The sole 
purpose of assumption d is to investigate the behavior of the represen- 
tative producer in long-run equilibrium.1o Thus, all producers are as- 
sumed to participate in the commodity program. The total land, A, 
eligible for program benefits is assumed to be fixed in the short run 
but is positively related to land rent in the long run. 
The time sequence of the model is as follows: at the beginning of 
the period (t = 0) farmers observe the target price of output p* and 
other input prices and commit on the choice of land L. A farmer may 
lease land from or to other farmers, depending on whether the desired 
level of L is less than or greater than the land L he owns. Free entry 
and exit are assumed to prevail at the beginning of the period. If the 
desired level of L is zero, the farmer exits from the market. The farmer 
enters the market if L is positive in the current period and was zero 
in the previous period. Thus, entry and land decisions are assumed to 
occur simultaneously at the beginning of the period." 
Once an incumbent or a new farmer commits to L, only nonland 
inputs can be varied and entry is blocked ex post. Nonland inputs are 
applied continuously throughout the period. At the end of the period 
(t = 1), application of nonland inputs are completed and output is 
realized. 
Ex Post Composite Input Decision 
Because land is a primary input whose supply is relatively inelastic, we 
distinguish land from other nonland inputs. Important nonland inputs 
include a primary factor, labor, and a host of intermediate inputs such 
as combines, specialized machinery, chemicals, and raw materials pur- 
chased from other competitive industries. These nonland inputs are 
lumped together and are treated as a composite input X for two rea- 
sons.12 First, the proportion of the labor force employed in the agricul- 
tural sector is relatively small in most developed countries. For exam- 
ple, increases in labor demand in the agricultural sector are not likely 
to affect significantly the wage rate in the United States. Thus, the 
wage rate is assumed to be exogenous. Second, the intermediate inputs 
used in agriculture are supplied by competitive firms in other sectors, 
and their prices are assumed to be given. For instance, increases in 
demand for farm chemicals may raise the prices of chemicals in the 
short run, but because they are produced by competitive firms, the 
long-run supplies of the intermediate inputs are perfectly elastic. 
Let w and r be the price of the nonland composite input and the 
rental price of land, respectively. At the beginning of the period, the 
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representative producer observes target price p* and input prices w 
and r and chooses the amount of land L to cultivate. Land is a quasi- 
fixed input; it is a variable input at the beginning of the production 
period, but once land is allocated the producer can only alter nonland 
inputs. Ideally, farm size can be measured by capacity or output level. 
A farm with 600 acres and one worker is not necessarily larger than a 
farm with 500 acres and 10 workers. Because producers are assumed 
to use identical technology, however, factor intensities are the same 
for all farmers. Thus, land is a useful proxy for "farm size" or produc- 
tion capacity. 
The total output generally depends on the distribution of the com- 
posite input over the production period. For simplicity, we assume 
that the total quantity of the composite input X is applied to land at a 
constant rate and application of the nonland input is completed at the 
end of the period.13 Then the output depends on the total amounts of 
X and L employed, and it is given by a concave production function, 
q = F(X, L). 
To eliminate indeterminacy of optimal output, we assume that F(.) is not linearly homogeneous. 
Land decision is made at the beginning of the period (t = 0). The 
composite input X is continuously applied to fixed land until the end 
of the period (t = 1). Because the total application of X is completed 
at t = 1, the composite input decision is termed an ex post decision. 
The competitive producer's problem at the end of the period is to 
choose X to maximize profit, 
7r = p*F(X, L) - wX - rL, 
where rL is the cost of land rent, which is fixed ex post. Because the 
composite input X is supplied by competitive industries, w is assumed 
to be fixed. The first order condition is p* Fx(X, L) - w = 0. Concavity 
of the production function insures that the composite input demand, 
X = X(p*, w, L), is inversely related to its price (OX/Ow = 1/p*Fxx 
< 0) and that an increase in the output price shifts the composite input 
demand schedule to the right (aX/Ip* = - wlp*2Fxx > 0). If L and X 
are complements (FxL > 0), then an increase in farm size L shifts the 
composite input demand schedule to the right (OX/OL = -FxL/Fxx > 
0). On the other hand, if they are substitutes (FxL < 0), an increase in 
L shifts demand for X to the left. 
The ex post supply function is written as 
q(p*, w, L) = F[X(p*, w, L), L]. (1) 
By concavity of the production function, we obtain Oq/Ow = w/p*2Fxx 
< O, Oq/Op* = -W2p*3Fxx > 0, and dq/dL = F, - Fx(FxL,/Fxx). 
Note that dq/dL is marginal product of land when the composite input 
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X is allowed to change in response to changes in L. Hence dq/dL is 
termed "gross" marginal product of land and is assumed to be posi- 
tive. It is straightforward to show that dqldL > 0 if land L is a normal 
factor.14 Concavity of the production function implies that q(p*, w, L) 
is also concave in L. Since F(O) is not linearly homogeneous, q(p*, w, 
L) is monotone increasing and strictly concave in L and an optimal 
output is determinate for any p*. 
Ex Ante Land Decision 
The representative firm incorporates the composite input demand func- 
tion X(p*, w, L) when making a land decision. Each individual farmer 
is allowed to lease land at the market rent if the desired level of land 
differs from the land he owns, L. At the end of the period, land is 
indivisible and fixed. However, land is perfectly divisible and land 
commitment is made at the beginning of the period. The producer 
chooses L at the beginning of the period to maximize profit,15 
7r = p*F[X(p*, w, L), L] - wX(p*, w, L) - rL, (2) 
where the land rent r is assumed to be fixed at the market clearing 
level. The first order condition is p*FL - r = 0, which is satisfied for 
a finite value of L > 0 because the production function is not linearly 
homogeneous.16 The land demand function derived can then be written 
as L = L(p*, w, r). From the first order condition, we get 
3L/Op* = - PFxx/p* A > 0, (3a) 
3L/Ow = -FxL/p* A, (3b) 
3L/Or = Fxx/p* A < 0, (3c) 
where A = FLLFxx - (FXL)2 > 0 by concavity of the production 
function, and p = FL - Fx(FxL/Fxx) = dqldL > 0 if land is a normal 
factor. 
Substituting L(p*, w, r) into (1) yields the ex ante supply function: 
q = q[p*, w, L(p*, w, r)]. (1') 
Differentiating (1') with respect to p* yields 
dq/dp* = (aq/ap*) + (dqldL)(aL/Op*). 
Thus, if L is a normal factor, the ex ante supply is more elastic than 
the ex post supply, that is, dqldp* > q/lap*.17 
Equilibrium Rent in the Short Run 
In equation (2), an individual farmer treats r as a given parameter, 
fixed at the market clearing level. Land demand L(p*, w, L) is variable 
in the short run, and equilibrium rent in the short run is determined 
by market demand for and supply of agricultural land. Let A denote 
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the fixed supply of land eligible for subsidies in the short run. Then 
equilibrium rent r satisfies the condition, 
NL(p*, w, r) = A. (4) 
How does an increase in the target price affect the equilibrium rent? 
Note that in the short run the number of farmers N is fixed. Differenti- 
ating the above condition with respect to p* yields 
dr/dpIN = - (OL/p*)/(OL/Or) = P = (dqldL) > 0, (4') 
which is analogous to the reciprocity relation in trade theory. 
III. Free Entry, Farm Size, and Factor Returns in Long-Run 
Equilibrium 
Recall that in the short run the number of farmers is fixed and individ- 
ual farmers treat the target price p* and land rent r as given parameters. 
Thus, for example, an increase in the target price will only affect the 
profit of the representative firm without affecting the number of firms. 
The prospect of increased profit, however, invites entry of new firms 
in the long run and the equilibrium number of firms must adjust accord- 
ingly. Entry of new firms in turn affects the rental price of land because 
its supply is inelastic. 
The neoclassical model of perfect competition is spaceless and the 
free entry condition guarantees zero profit of the representative firm.18 
The free entry condition insures that the rental price of the fixed factor 
L is responsive to changes in the target price in long-run equilibrium. 
Changes in the target price may not trigger instantaneous changes in 
land rent and the number of producers. In fact, it may take several 
periods before the new equilibrium land rent and the number of firms 
are restored. The simplifying assumption of free entry at the beginning 
of the production period is adopted to investigate the long-run re- 
sponses in factor returns and farm size and is not intended to describe 
market responses in the short run. The plausibility of this assumption 
is discussed later by comparing the price elasticities of current rent 
and long-run equilibrium rent. 
For the representative firm to be in long-run equilibrium, the land 
demand function L(p*, w, r) must satisfy an additional condition that 
profit be nonnegative. Substituting L(p*, w, r) into (2) yields the indi- 
rect profit function 
,r(p*, w, r) = p*F{X[p*, w, L(p*, w, r)], L(p*, w, r)} 
- wX[p*, w, L(p*, w, r)] - rL(p*, w, r). 
For the farmers to survive, the output and factor prices must be such 
that Ir(p*, w, r) is greater than or equal to zero. If IT(p*, w, r) is 
negative, then potential producers simply do not enter the market and 
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some of the incumbent producers will exit from the market since zero 
profit is guaranteed by exiting from the market. Moreover, if rr(p*, w, 
r) is positive, entry of new producers will be triggered. The number of 
producers is stable and the market is in long-run equilibrium if the 
representative producer earns zero profit, 
Sw(p*, w, r) = 0. (5) 
The zero profit condition states that, for any target price p*, there 
exist many input price combinations that yield zero profit. We now 
derive the input price frontier in the (w, r) space that satisfies the zero 
profit constraint in equation (5). Let aL L/q and ax X/q be the 
amounts of land and the composite input used per unit of output pro- 
duced, respectively. Note that profit maximization requires cost mini- 
mization. The least cost combinations of inputs to produce one unit of 
output generally depend on input prices. Thus, the input-output ratios 
can be written as aL = aL(w, r) and ax = ax(w, r). The unit cost is 
g(w, r, q) = aL(w, r, q) r + a(w, r, q)w. (6) 
The zero profit condition in (5) can be rewritten 
p* q - g(w, r, q)q = 0, 
where c(q, w, r) = g(w, r, q)q is total cost. The first order condition 
for optimal output is 
p* 
- gq - g = 0, (7) 
where gqq - g = cq is marginal cost. Dividing the zero profit condition 
by q gives 
p* - g(w, r, q) = 0, (8) 
which defines a unit cost frontier in (w, r) space along which unit cost 
is equal to the target price p*. In view of (7), we have gq = 0. In other 
words, long-run equilibrium is characterized by a minimum of the unit 
production cost. 
Three Propositions on Long-Run Equilibrium 
There are two ways to assess the long-run impacts of a change in the 
target price on land rent. If agriculture accounts for a large fraction of 
gross national product, a general equilibrium production model with 
two sectors-agriculture and manufacture-can then be developed to 
assess the impacts of changes in the target price. For example, if the 
price of the composite input is significantly affected, the two sector 
model is relevant and the well-known Stolper-Samuelson theorem can 
then be used to assess the impacts on rent of a change in the support 
price. 
If agriculture accounts for a small fraction of total output, as in 
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many developed countries, a partial equilibrium model is more appro- 
priate in which land is a specific factor in agriculture. If agriculture 
uses inputs such as labor and intermediate inputs commonly used in 
other industries and if the input demands in agriculture account for a 
small fraction of aggregate demands in these factor markets, then the 
increased demand for the composite input in agriculture will not sig- 
nificantly raise the price of the nonland composite input. In this re- 
spect, D. Gale Johnson argued that rising target prices are unlikely to 
raise the returns to farm labor. Even earlier he observed that the prices 
of "most inputs purchased from the non-farm sector of the economy, 
such as fertilizers, tractors, fuel and insecticides, and feeds and feed- 
stuffs" are affected little by the level of farm output prices.19 Thus, 
the price of the composite nonland input is assumed constant and 
insensitive to changes in the output price. 
In contrast, land is specific to agriculture and the quantity of land 
supplied is fixed in the short run. Oscar R. Burt maintains that "the 
amount of farmland available may change gradually over time, but 
these changes are relatively insensitive to farm prices because they 
emanate from government appropriations" such as reclamations, high- 
way developments, and urban growth.20 Moreover, to control program 
cost, the government often limits annually the quantity of land eligible 
for price subsidy programs. Thus, the supply of land is likely to be 
relatively inelastic even in the long run. 
Because the supply of land is not perfectly elastic, new producers 
can enter the market only by bidding up the rental price of land. Thus, 
an increase in the target price is accompanied by increases in producer 
surplus and rental price of land. However, this induced increase in 
land rent causes the representative producer to use nonland inputs 
more intensively. If the long-run equilibrium farm size L* decreases 
(increases) with p*, then entry (exit) of firms continues until a new 
market equilibrium is restored at a higher land rent. We will show 
below that, under reasonable conditions, an increase in the target price 
only raises land rent and does not affect the long-run equilibrium farm 
size L*. In this case an increase in the target price initially raises entry 
pressure, but the latter is completely offset by the rise in rental rate 
and no entry actually occurs. 
Recall from equation (8) that a given target price p* defines a 
factor price frontier g(w, r, q) or a locus of input prices (w, r) that are 
consistent with the long-run equilibrium. If the price of the composite 
input w is fixed, however, there exists a unique rent r* - r*(p*, w) 
that yields zero profit. Let the asterisk (*) denote that the variable is 
evaluated in long-run equilibrium, corresponding to a target price p*. 
Let qf denote the long-run equilibrium output associated with the 
target price p*. For given w, the long-run equilibrium rent r< is ob- 
tained at point A, the intersection of the unit cost frontier g1(w, r, q1) 
and the vertical line w in figure 1. Consider now the effect of an in- 
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crease in the target price from p* to p*. This increase in the target 
price shifts the unit cost frontier from 
gl(w, 
r, 
ql) 
to g2(w, r, q2). The 
new equilibrium can be established at point B, at the intersection of 
the vertical line w and g2(w, r, q2). If the factor prices do not change 
as in the short run, an increase in the target price will benefit every 
producer, that is, lr/O8p* = q* > 0. At p* every producer expects to 
earn a positive economic profit, and hence entry pressure exists. If the 
rental price of land is fixed at r* or rises below the new equilibrium 
level 
r2,* entry 
occurs. Free entry assures that, in the long run, the 
producer surplus vanishes and the market rental price rises to the 
equilibrium level, r*. Thus, if the supply of the composite input is 
perfectly elastic and free entry is guaranteed, then in the long run 
higher target prices cannot benefit landless producers.21 The landown- 
ers eventually extract the entire surplus from a higher target price that 
would accrue to producers if rent were fixed. 
Price Elasticity of Equilibrium Rent 
We now investigate how the long-run equilibrium rent r*(p*, w) re- 
sponds to a change in the target price. Observe that the zero profit 
condition does not directly depend on the aggregate land supply. Thus, 
r2 B 
r 
1r 9 2 (w , r, q 2 
g91(w, r,ql) 
w 
FIG. 1.-Target prices and equilibrium rents 
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equation (5) or equation (8) contains sufficient information to deter- 
mine how r* will respond to a change in p* for given w. Accordingly, 
long-run equilibrium rent r*(p*, w) is independent of whether the ag- 
gregate land supply A (r) is vertical or positively sloped. Totally differ- 
entiating equation (5) yields 
dr*/dp* = - /rr = q*/L*, 
where (q/L) is the average product of land. The price elasticity of 
equilibrium rent is 
e = (dr*/dp*)(p*/r*) = p*q*/r*L* = 1/OL > 1, 
where OL 
- 
r* L*/p* q* is the distributional share of land or the propor- 
tion of revenue spent on rent, which is less than unity.22 
In the short run, the quantity of eligible land is controlled by 
government. The supply of eligible land can increase with the rent in 
the long run. Let A(r) be the total land supply, A'(r) ? 0, and let R* 
= r*A(r*) denote the total rental income of the landowners in long-run 
equilibrium. The elasticity of rental income with respect to price is 
-(dR*/dp*)(p*/R*) = e(1 + EL)> 1, 
where EL (dA/dr)(r/A) is the rent elasticity of land supply, EL 
- 
0. 
If the land supply is fixed, EL is zero and i reduces to e. If A'(r) ? 0, 
then rental income rises faster than rent. 
PROPOSITION 1. Assume that entry is free and the supply of the 
composite input is perfectly elastic. Then the price elasticity of long- 
run equilibrium rent is e (dr*/dp*)(p*/r*) = 1/OL > 1, and the price 
elasticity of long-run equilibrium rental income is 
- 
(dR*/p*)(p*/R*) 
= (1 + EL)/OL > e. 
If the rental price of land were perfectly flexible or entry free, 
then the equilibrium adjustment would occur within a single production 
period. If the market adjustment of rent is slow, the price elasticity of 
current rent will be less than e and can be less than unity. Let E* be 
the long-run price elasticity of rent, and let Et (art/p)(Pt/rt) be the 
elasticity of current rent with respect to the target price, where rt and 
pt are the land rent and the target price in the current period. Then 
the index E, -Et/E* provides an indirect measure of ease of entry.23 
If E, = 1, entry is free, and Et = 0 represents the situation where 
entry is blocked as in a monopoly. 
Lloyd D. Teigen reported the price elasticity of farm family in- 
come by sales class for 1983.24 Farm family income is the sum of farm 
income and nonfarm income of farm families. For producers with sales 
of more than $40,000 in 1983, the elasticity of current farm family 
income with respect to the target price exceeded 3, whereas the elastic- 
ity was a little above unity for producers with sales below $10,000.25 
A very small fraction of farm family income in the latter group is likely 
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to come from rental income, while a higher proportion of farm family 
income of producers in the former group is from owning land. The 
elasticity of rental income would be even higher than that of farm 
family income if farm families have nonrental income sources, includ- 
ing off-farm income. 
Short-Run and Long-Run Incidences of Program Benefits 
John T. Scott has compared the net rent and the average price of corn 
per bushel in Illinois between 1959 and 1982.26 The average price of 
corn was roughly $1.00 between 1959 and 1962, rose to $1.26 in 1970, 
$2.00 in 1973, and $3.00 in 1974, and fell to $2.50 in 1982. The net rent 
to landowners was roughly $23 between 1959 and 1962, rose to $33 in 
1970, $85 in 1973, and $107 in 1974, and then declined to $90 in 1982. 
Ordinary least square (OLS) estimates for parameters of a linear model 
relating current rent to the average corn price imply an elasticity of 
1.35.27 
If it takes more than one period for the rent to reach the long-run 
equilibrium value r*, the elasticity of current rent with respect to the 
target price, Et = (Or,/Opt)(Pt/rt), will be less than the long-run equilib- 
rium price elasticity of rent, E*. If the target price is raised and main- 
tained for many periods, Et will approach its limiting value E* p* q*/ 
r*L* as t approaches oo. Because the average land share rL/pq for 
corn in Illinois between 1959 and 1982 was about 30%, the implied 
value of E* was 3.33. Since Et/E* = 0.41, roughly 40% of equilibrium 
rent adjustment was made within a year. At this rate, more than 98% 
of equilibrium rent adjustment will be within 3 years (.4 + .6 x .4 + 
.36 x .4 = .9841). For practical purposes, it can be argued that in 
agriculture the long run spans three production periods. 
A nonlandowner producer will capture some benefits in the first 
year following an increase in subsidy in writing a contract for an annual 
lease. If the increased target price persists for 3 years, a long-term 
lease would benefit the nonlandowner producer even more. Incentives 
for writing a long-term lease would be moderated, however, if there is 
uncertainty in future target prices. 
Scott's data also show that sizable profits accrue in the short run 
to producers who do not own the land. In the short run, the zero profit 
condition does not hold, and hence p* q* = rL + wX + rn, or 
p* = aLr + axw + p, (9) 
where aL = L/q and ax = X/q are the input-output coefficients, and 
p = ur/q is per unit profit. In terms of proportional changes, equation 
(8) can be rewritten 
1 = aL(IP*) + ax(~/i*) + ap( / *), (9') 
where cL = rL/p* q, 
ax 
= wL/p* q and ac = p/p* are the distributional 
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shares of land, the composite input, and short-run profit, respectively. 
The land share UL was 0.3, so the combined share of the composite 
input and farm entrepreneurial input was 0.7, and the elasticity of their 
combined return with respect to the target price was 0.86.28 
If all producers were owner-operators they would be the single 
beneficiaries from price subsidies. Proposition 1 indicates that the long- 
run incidence of benefits of commodity programs depends on landown- 
ership of producers. In actuality, however, there is no clear-cut demo- 
graphic division of producers and landlords, because some producers 
also are landowners and some owners are part owners. For our pur- 
pose, however, an operational distinction can be made between the 
land operated and the land leased. G. A. Bernat reported that of the 
932 million acres operated in 1982, 377 million acres were rented and 
operated in 1982.29 That is, about 40% of the operating land was rented 
to other producers. Similarly, the U.S. Department of Agriculture re- 
ports that the total land in farms was 987 million acres in 1982.30 Full 
owners operated 34.7% and part owners operated 53.8% of land in 
farms. If we assume that part owners owned 50% of land owned, the 
total land owned by producers would be 61.6%. These land ownership 
patterns imply that approximately 40% of program benefits in the long 
run went to landowners who were not producers. 
Target Price and Equilibrium Farm Size 
Insofar as landless producers can benefit from price subsidies in the 
short run, prospects of higher profits will affect land demand in the 
current period. Landless owners reap windfall gains or losses in 
the short run until a new long-run equilibrium is established. If a 
change in the target price is permanent, no benefits accrue to landless 
producers once the new long-run equilibrium is established. However, 
because the induced change in land rental alters the factor proportions 
to minimize production cost, a permanent change in the target price 
may increase or decrease the long-run equilibrium farm size L*. 
We now investigate how an increase in the target price affects the 
long-run farm size and the number of farmers. Let L* and N* respec- 
tively denote long-run equilibrium farm size and the number of farmers 
corresponding to target price p*. Then long-run equilibrium farm size 
is equal to land demand when r = r*. Thus L* can be written L* = 
L(p*, r*, w). The equilibrium number of farmers N* can be obtained 
by dividing the aggregate land supply A(r*) by L*, that is, N*(p*, r*, 
w) A(r*)/L(p*, r*, w). 
Recall that profit wr(p*, w, r) is zero and the optimal value of land 
L* is the farm size in long-run equilibrium. To obtain the equilibrium 
farm size, we use p = 0 and solve for L in equation (9). An increase 
in the target price affects the equilibrium farm size L* directly, holding 
rent constant, and also indirectly via the adjustment in the equilibrium 
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rent r*. The total effect on the equilibrium farm size is 
dL*/dp* = aLlap* + (aL/ar)(dr*/dp*), 
where the first term on the right side is the direct effect, and the second 
term is the indirect effect. Using equations (3a) and (3c), we obtain 
dL*/dp* = (q*/L* - dq/dL)Fxx/p*A = (1 - 8)qFxx/p*AL*, (10) 
where 8 = (dqldL)(L/q) is the land elasticity of output. 
PROPOSITION 2. Assume that the total land supply is fixed and 
entry is free, and consider an increase in the target price p*. Then 
i) L* decreases, increases or remains constant according to 
whether 8 is less than, greater than, or equal to unity, and 
ii) N* increases, decreases, or remains constant according to 
whether 8 is less than, greater than, or equal to unity. 
This proposition indicates that the land elasticity of output plays 
a key role in determining the impacts of price supports on the industry 
structure. It is widely believed that land yield (q/L) is roughly indepen- 
dent of farm size. In this instance, changes in the target prices have 
no impact on the long-run equilibrium farm size L*. 
Bruce Gardner and Lloyd D. Teigen have reported subsidies and 
the numbers of producers participating in major U.S. commodity pro- 
grams.31 Price subsidies declined for most of the commodities, re- 
mained stable for rice and barley, and increased for milk between 
1968 and 1978.32 The number of producers, however, declined in all 
commodity groups between 1949 and 1978. If land yield is independent 
of farm size, then the continued decline in the number of commodity 
producers must be attributed to other factors (e.g., technological ad- 
vance), and not to declining target prices as has been suggested.33 
Target Price and Supply Response 
We now examine how the aggregate supply responds to changes in the 
target price. Assume that the land elasticity of output 8 is unity and 
the aggregate land supply is fixed. The long-run equilibrium output of 
the representative producer is obtained by substituting L(p*, w, r) into 
(1): 
q*(p*, w, r) = q[p*, w, L(p*, w, r)]. 
Differentiating q* with respect to p* yields 
dq*/dp* = aq/ap* + (dqldL)(dL*/dp*) = Oq/Op > 0. 
Recall that the equilibrium farm size L* and the number of firms N* 
are not affected by changes in the target price. But long-run equilib- 
rium output q* rises with the target price, because the representative 
producer uses the nonland input more intensively as the equilibrium 
rental price r* rises. Note that 6 = 1 implies that dN*/dp* = (A'/ 
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L*)(drldp*) O0. Thus, the long-run equilibrium industry output Q* = 
N* q* also increases with the target price (dQ*Idp* > 0). 
PROPOSITION 3. Assume that 8 = 1. Then the long-run equilibrium 
firm output q* and the aggregate supply of output Q* increase with 
the target price. 
Gardner reported the "long-run" supply elasticities of 17 com- 
modity groups for 3 years (1927, 1953, and 1978). For all commodity 
groups the long-run supply elasticities rarely exceeded unity, except 
for dairy in 1972. These data indicate that the long-run supplies of 
these commodities are generally price inelastic. 
IV. Concluding Remarks 
In the case of net rent in Illinois between 1959 and 1982, the current 
price elasticity of rent exceeded unity, and about 40% of long-run 
rent adjustment was made within a year. This example shows that 
equilibrium rental adjustments may not be fully made within a single 
year. This empirical evidence is consistent with Gardner's position 
that landless producers gain from commodity programs in the short 
run. But the theory supports D. Gale Johnson's observation that com- 
modity programs mainly benefit landowners in the long run. Although 
producers receive price subsidies, free entry and perfectly elastic sup- 
ply of the composite input insure that landowners eventually extract 
the entire benefits from price subsidies and that landless producers do 
not benefit from commodity programs in the long run. Since about 60% 
of the U.S. farmland is owned by operating producers, roughly 60% 
of the benefits of commodity programs goes ultimately to U.S. com- 
modity producers in the form of rent. 
It should be noted that our analysis is based on the assumption of 
homogeneous producers and points to the need to analyze commodity 
programs with heterogeneous producers.34 Although it is beyond the 
scope of this article, some conjectures can be made. Farmers facing 
price uncertainty may have access to identical production technology, 
but risk attitudes may differ considerably among farmers. Thus, even 
in a given commodity group, farm sizes will differ among farmers de- 
pending on their risk attitudes. Since each farmer maximizes expected 
utility, farm size will be determinate even if the production function 
exhibits constant returns to scale. Other things being equal, farm size 
would be inversely related to risk aversion. While a marginal farmer 
earns a normal return from the risk he or she takes, less risk averse 
farmers may earn positive economic profits even in long-run equi- 
librium. 
Notes 
* We are grateful to Ed Tower, William Meyers, Bruce Gardner, and two 
anonymous referees for their comments that resulted in substantial improve- 
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Iowa Agriculture and Home Economics Experiment Station, Ames, Iowa, 
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